"Law is a seamless system with its own autonomy. It provides one correct answer to any cases, difficult or not, by application of its rules, precedents, principles and spirit."

I INTRODUCTION

In this article, I will try to analyze the above statement by using Ronald Dworkin's and Herbert L. A. Hart's theories respectively before turning to my opinion. Essentially, the statement is identical to the Theory of Adjudication of Dworkin who pictures law as a gapless legal universe in which there is always a correct answer. On the other hand, Dworkin's former teacher and predecessor as Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford University, Hart, holds a completely opposite view. He argues that rules are "open-textured" and the judges fill in the gaps left by rules by using their discretion. As Dworkin's theory involves and is based on a great deal of criticisms of Hart's theory, it would be more desirable to analyze Hart's theory first and then Dworkin's.

II HART'S THEORY

H. L. A. Hart, as a positivist, moved legal positivism in a different direction though he continued to insist on the importance of the separation of law from morality. He rejects the "command theory" and states that law comprises rules

entirely which are divided into two categories - primary (duty-imposing rules) and secondary rules (power-imposing rules). Primary rules grant rights or impose legal obligations upon the citizens, for example, criminal law consists only of primary rules. Secondary rules stipulate how primary rules are formed and validated, involving rules of change, adjudication and recognition. For instance, the rules that stipulate how Congress is composed and how it enacts legislation are secondary rules.

One of the most important areas of Hart's theory is his "open texture theory" of the rules of law. He actually derived this concept from the work of Fredrich Waismann, which was in turn possibly based on a constructive view of language put forward by Ludwig Wittgenstein. However, the use of the term by the two philosophers is different. In Waismann's work, "open texture" referred to the potential vagueness of words under extreme circumstances while Hart put forward the concept of "open texture" as an argument for why rules should be applied in a way which require judicial discretion.

By "open-texture", Hart means that in some situations, judges need to exercise their discretion when a case is not governed by any existing rule of law. This is due to the indeterminacy of the application of rules. Hart explains by giving three main reasons :

Firstly, language is indeterminate. Legal rules are composed of words and they aim to communicate the required standards of behaviour. Nevertheless, words are always problematic and imprecise. According to Hart, one or more words in a legal rule have a core of plain meaning. Here, he gives us an excellent example or illustration, "No vehicles is allowed in the park". If we want to apply this rule, we need to consider whether a particular object us a "vehicle" or whether a particular area is a "park". Let us focus on the word "vehicle". In plain cases, for example, a car or a coach, there is not much problem because they both have four wheels and are petrol-engined and we have long recognized them as vehicles. However, in cases in the "penumbra" of the term's meaning (outside its core meaning) or in borderline cases, we cannot be certain whether the word should apply or not. Examples would be roller skates or motorcycles. Roller skates do not have engines while motorcycles got only two wheels instead of four. So, can we say that they are vehicles and should be prohibited from entering the park? Hart then said that there are reasons both for and against the use of a word and the person called upon to answer the question need to consider whether the present case resembles the plain case 'sufficiently' in 'relevant' respects. Therefore, the discretion left to him by language is very wide. But at the same time, there are restraints when he exercises his discretion. Hart maintains that we can never exclude a 'penumbra' of uncertainty because we are men, not gods. It is impossible to be certain that all material issues are included when creating a law to deal with a particular situation. Also it is impossible to be able to anticipate future developments and think of the best way to deal with new situations which may arise when creating a law.

Secondly, very general standards are used in the rules. Very often, we find words like 'fairness', 'reasonableness' or 'justice' in the rules which impose very general standards to all different kinds of situations. Therefore, uncertainty would easily arise because of the unclear and imprecise standards.

Thirdly, there is indeterminacy in the common law system of precedent. Hart pointed out that there is no clear rule governing the selection of precedents and also the process of extracting holdings. Finally, the judges may either narrow or widen the rules extracted from the precedents.

Therefore according to Hart, there is no unique answer and judges may exercise their discretion to make new laws if some situations arise and they particular cannot find any existing rule which is relevant, for example in hard cases within the area of the penumbra.

III DWORKIN'S THEORY AND HIS CRITICISM TO HART'S THEORY

Ronald Dworkin made strong criticisms to both Natural Law and Legal Positivism and many people say that Dworkin's theory occupies a middle ground between Natural Law and Legal Positivism as the third theory of law.

Dworkin, in his writing, Tlaking Rights Easily (published in 1977), triggered his first criticism towards Hart. He challenges on two main grounds of Hart's theory : Law composed entirely of rules ; judges have discretion in their decision-making where the dispute was not covered by any existing rule.

In order to understand why Dworkin sets out the above criticisms, it is necessary to have thorough idea of his Theory of Adjudication first. He criticizes Hart that it is a big mistake to say that law is made up of rules only and judges make use of one and only one standard when deciding cases. Dworkin here gives us a different picture of law : there are numerous and varied standards that judges can find in legal system when resolving disputes. He argues that apart from rules, we can also find principles. The term 'principles' cover different types of norms, principles, policies, et cetera in a legal system. There are mainly two differences when comparing rules and principles. Firstly, rules apply in an all-or-nothing fashion while principles does not. It means when a rule applies to a case, no other rule can apply as an alternative at the same time. An example would be the three strike rule in a baseball games which everyone should know. On the contrary, principles may not determine the decision even if they apply in a case. They only provide a reason to the case and they may conflict with each other. The best example would be Elmer's case that I will explain in details later in this section. It was held in this case that the murderer or the defendant was denied the inheritance due to the principle, 'No one should be permitted to benefit from his own wrongdoing'. We can see that the principle is the determining factor, but it does not determine the decision of every case to which it applies.

Because of the tendency to conflict, principles have weight. If two or more principles apply to a case (usually some of them point to a direction and one or two points to the other, for example the policy of posing regulations or restrictions to activities in the stock market intersects with the principle of freedom of market), we need to add up the weight of the principles on each side and make a balance between them in order to reach a decision. On the other hand, rules do not have weight and are not balanced. They either apply to a case or not. And once a rule applies to a case, it will determine the decision.

According to Dworkin, when a judge decides a case, he is not limited only to rules, actually he can also find the answer in other standards, for example, principles which the judges are bound to consider if appropriate. However, he disagreed strongly with Hart that judges have judicial discretion when deciding hard cases. Instead, he contends that law is a seamless system where one must be able to find a correct answer for every case by searching through the 'moral fabric' of the society.

Regarding to the question of judicial discretion, Dworkin, outlines three possible meanings of the term 'discretion'. There are two 'weak' senses and one 'strong' sense. He agrees that judges may exercise their discretion in 'weak' sense - they must use judgments in applying the standards set him by authority, and that their decisions are final and no higher authority would review or set them aside. Nevertheless, Dworkin objects to the 'hard' sense of discretion, that is judges can use their discretion to make decision without being bound by any standard. According to Dworkin, there is little legal indeterminacy and thus there is little basis for judicial discretion in strong sense. He also made two arguments. First, it would be identical to make new laws and that should be the task of democratically elected officials instead of judges. And secondly, the courts will engage in retroactive legislation and th at would be unfair to the losing party who will be punished not because he or she has violated some existing laws.

Dworkin pointed out that judges must be able to find a correct answer by looking through all the rules, principles and other standards. He further illustrates this by analyzing some decided cases or as Dworkin said, 'hard' cases. One of them is Elmer's case th at I have mentioned above. In this case, the deceased, Mr. Palmer made a will to his grandson, the defendant of his estate. After that, Mr. Palmer remarried and because of that, the defendant was afraid that his grandfather may change his will at any the and he will get nothing. Therefore, he decided to murder Mr. Palmer and finally, he was convicted and was sentenced to imprisonment for a couple of years. The question raised by this case is whether the defendant should be legally entitled to will after he came out of the jail. According to the New York State statue, this will is valid and the defendant was entitled to it. However eventually, the majority of the court decided the case against him as they based their arguments on the long-established principle, 'No one should be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong'. This case illustrates that when deciding cases, judges need to search for the correct answer in all the standards in the society, that is both rules and principles - the latter being part of the community's moral and political culture and exist independently of legal institutions enacting the rules of law. We can see that the principle, 'No one should be permitted to profit from his wrongdoing' is the determining factor in the Elmer's case and its application resulted in the same legal authority as the application of a legal rule.

Finally, Dworkin further elaborates his arguments by introducing us the hypothetical ideal judge, Hercules who has superhuman power that most judges lack. He can find out the correct answers for all 'hard cases' by analyzing all the applicable rules and principles. In order to do that, Hercules need to build the 'soundest theory' of law beforehand which represents the law as a seamless web of legal rules, principles and other legal standards and he would be able to justify every correct answer by referring to the soundest theory and the theory of adjudication.

IV ANALYSIS AND COMMENTS

After demonstrating both Hart's and Dworkin's theories, I am going to further analyze the statement and give comments throughout this section.

It is the core idea of Dworkin's Theory of Adjudication that law is a seamless system. I have doubt about this. According to Dworkin, if the judges cannot find applicable legal rules, they can turn to principles or other legal standards and a correct answer must be inside that seamless web of law. I agree with Dworkin that there are also principles in a legal system and this proposition may be right for most cases. However, when we have a look at our society nowadays, there are numerous loopholes in our legal system that the wrongdoers can always escape their responsibilities. The best example would be the pirated CDs and VCDs problem in Hong Kong. Currently, there is not sufficient legislation to prohibit the illegal activities effectively. And if we try to rely on principles, we will discover another problem of principles. They are not concrete or accurate enough for the judges to make an absolute decision (The principle, we shall not steal, does not point to stealing copyrights of CDs and VCDs specifically). Moreover, the society keeps moving every day and the development of science and technology is fast beyond imagination. New products and technologies are invented every day, therefore rules can hardly keep up-to-date with everything new and principles or moral standards may not be applicable any more.

Dworkin also claims that there must be a correct answer for every case by searching through the moral fabric of law. Again, I do not agree that there must be a correct answer to be found. Several principles point to one direction and another set points to another. Judges need to add up their weight and make a balance. But sometimes the weight of both sides may be identically the same and so how should judges make a decision in these circumstances?

Though in my opinion, law is not a seamless web as what Dworkin said, I do not agree with Hart that judges can use their discretion if there is no applicable rule of law. Legislation should not be the job for the judges as we know that separation of powers is an essential element of the rule of law. It is of vital importance to our society as it avoids the abuse of power by the government. Moreover, retroactive legislation is unfair to the defendant as have mentioned in the previous section. However, there is an opinion that though retroactive legislation is undesirable, it is better than not settling the dispute when no existing rule of law is applicable. I do not think it is correct. Every conviction should have legal basis and it should be a preference to ensure fairness and justice in the court proceedings.

V. CONCLUSION

We can see that Dworkin's theory is more or less the same as what it is said in the statement given - in short, law is a gapless system of rules, principles and other legal standards and it provides a correct answer for any cases. After analyzing the theories of Hart and Dworkin, I place myself in a position in between them. I agree with Hart that there are loopholes in our legal system but I rejected his idea of judicial discretion. When compare Dworkin's theory with the current legal system, his proposition of law as a seamless web may be too perfect. I hope Dworkin's seamless legal system would exist in the future so that all cases would be solved with no difficulty.

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